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Abstract Measuring autistic traits in the general population
has proven sensitive for examining cognition. The present
study extended this to pro-social behaviour, investigating the
influence of expectations to help others. A novel task
describing characters in need of help was administered to
students scoring high versus low on the Autism-Spectrum
Quotient. Scenarios had two variants, describing either a
‘clear-cut’ or ‘ambiguous’ social rule. Participants with high
versus low autistic traits were less pro-social and sympathetic
overall towards the characters. The groups’ ratings of char-
acters’ expectations were comparable, but those with high
autistic traits provided more rule-based rationales in the clear-
cut condition. This pattern of relatively intact knowledge in
the context of reduced pro-social behaviour has implications
for social skill training programmes.
Keywords Autistic traits  Pro-social behaviour 
Empathy  Mentalising  Social rules  Social knowledge
Introduction
Successful social functioning entails processing and
responding sensitively to subtle and complex information
provided by the social world. Whilst there is a wealth of
literature exploring cognitive accounts of autism spectrum
disorder (ASD), very little work has examined how these
translate into everyday social functioning and impact on
specific aspects of social interaction, in particular pro-
social behaviour such as helping and sharing with others,
volunteering time or donating money. Two studies exam-
ining charitable giving found that adults with ASD donated
less than matched controls (Lin et al. 2012; Izuma et al.
2011). Parental reports indicated that children with ASD
tend to display significantly less pro-social behaviour
compared to typically developing children, e.g. being kind
and considerate to others, sharing or offering practical help
(Meyer et al. 2006; Allik et al. 2006). Several small-scale
interventions using social stories have attempted to pro-
mote pro-social behaviour in children with ASD (e.g. see
Crozier and Tincani 2007; Leaf et al. 2009). Recent work
has examined the use of oxytocin, which is thought to play
a role in regulating and promoting social behaviour, in
individuals with ASD, and this seems to show some pro-
mise (e.g. see Andari et al. 2010).
In the light of the established social and emotional
deficits associated with ASD, it is important to understand
what predicates pro-social behaviour, and how factors in
the social environment might facilitate or inhibit this. Pro-
social behaviour is thought to be driven by empathy
(Eisenberg 2007; Minio-Paluello et al. 2009), via ‘self’- or
‘other’-oriented processes (Schaller and Cialdini 1988).
Vicariously invoked feelings of distress and increased
physiological arousal when witnessing someone in need
may result in a desire to alleviate the pain shared by the
onlooker, thus stimulating a response to help. The resulting
action is thus self-oriented and motivated by a need to
reduce the vicarious empathic arousal experienced. On the
other hand, pro-social behaviour may be driven by an
intuitive understanding of the other’s thoughts, feeling and
needs (Jameel et al. 2014).
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The self- versus other-orientated routes for motivating pro-
social behaviour can be viewed as analogous to the separable
‘emotional’ and ‘cognitive’ components that contribute to-
wards the experience of empathy. ‘Emotional’ empathy refers
to the ability to resonate with and share another’s emotional
state. By contrast, ‘cognitive’ empathy, or mentalising (also
synonymous with theory of mind or perspective-taking), de-
scribes the ability to infer others’ mental states and thus what
they might be thinking or feeling in any given situation (for a
discussion of cognitive vs emotional ‘fine cuts’ see: Blair
2008). Mentalising is thought to be impaired in individuals
with ASD, with difficulties in interpreting others’ intentions,
thoughts and feelings, whereas most evidence suggests that
ability to empathise with others’ emotional states is intact.
However, upon close inspection the literature reveals a
slightly messier picture. Some studies examining emotional
empathy have found impairment in those with ASD (Hum-
phreys et al. 2007) and others have not (Adolphs et al. 2001).
Where there is evidence for intact emotional empathy, this is
thought to reflect some capacity of those with ASD to resonate
emotionally with others, but via a self-stance (Frith and de
Vignemont 2005; Minio-Paluello et al. 2009). However,
whilst the cognitive and emotional components of empathy
are thought to be dissociable in principle, they are likely to be
used in concert in everyday life.
It has been suggested that individuals with high-function-
ing ASD sometimes rely on compensatory strategies, such as
the application of learned social rules to alleviate mentalising
deficits (Hill and Frith 2003). This is supported by neuroi-
maging evidence demonstrating that during online mentalis-
ing, high-functioning individuals with ASD show reduced
activation in brain regions typically associated with this type
of activity, even when correct mental state attributions are
made (Happe et al. 1996). Conversely, individuals with high-
functioning ASD tend to show greater activation in areas
typically associated with more general problem-solving
abilities (Happe et al. 1996). Reliance on compensatory
mechanisms such as drawing on previously acquired social
knowledge may disguise social difficulties to an extent, but
clumsy and inflexible patterns of social behaviour may occur
in more complex, unpredictable social circumstances.
Clinical accounts tend to support the notion that high-
functioning individuals with ASD draw upon compensa-
tory mechanisms to navigate the social world. Mu¨ller et al.
(2008) individually interviewed adults with ASD to discuss
their social and communication challenges. Their descrip-
tions included difficulties with ‘chit-chat’ conversations
that tend not to follow predictable sets of rules, and pro-
blems in following unstructured dialogue that require
improvised responses. References were also made to
actively learning how to behave socially via observation of
others’ social interactions. Whilst appropriate social
behaviour is thought to involve the acquisition of
knowledge about social roles, norms, and scripts, it also
requires flexible application of these resources to navigate
novel scenarios accurately (Riggio and Reichard 2008).
Evidence from real-life-type tasks suggests that high-
functioning individuals with ASD may show proficiency in
simple structured social tasks, but difficulties with more
advanced and naturalistic tasks. For instance, when asked to
make judgments about subtle social behaviours (e.g. faux-pas
or deception), individuals with high-functioning ASD may
provide correct answers, but the reasoning behind their
judgments is often inaccurate or inappropriate (Bowler 1992;
Moran et al. 2011). Moreover, in real-life-type problem sol-
ving tasks, high-functioning participants with ASD have been
found to display difficulty in generating problem solutions,
but not in selecting from alternatives presented to them
(Channon et al. 2001, 2014). Participants with ASD were thus
able to recognise the best solution from a selection of options
(i.e. low task demand), but not to produce high quality solu-
tions spontaneously (i.e. high task demand).
Studies of individuals with high autistic trait scores
drawn from the general population has suggested a pattern
of social, cognitive and emotional features similar to, but
less severe than that typically observed in ASD. For
example, Go¨kc¸en et al. (2014) found that higher numbers
of autistic traits were associated with lower self-rated
levels of emotional perception and expression, poorer
performance on a classic task involving predicting char-
acters’ emotional states from pictures of their eyes, and
impairment on a task examining cognitive flexibility.
A recent study (Jameel et al. 2014) examined everyday pro-
social performance in students scoring high versus low on a
measure of autistic traits (Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ);
Baron-Cohen et al. 2001). Participants were presented with
everyday situations involving a character in need of their help.
Each scenario thus involved a difficult social judgment with
respect to balancing the needs of the character against the
participant’s own interests. For instance, if someone sees a man
fall over heavily in front of them, do they stop to help, even if it
means being late to work? Those scoring high on the AQ were
found to behave less pro-socially than their low AQ counter-
parts, both when asked to generate pro-social courses of action,
and to select them from alternatives. Participants were also
asked to give self- versus other-satisfaction ratings corre-
sponding to three different courses of helping actions, ranging
from low to high pro-social value (i.e. carry on walking, stop
briefly to help the man up, or stop to help the man up and see
what additional assistance he may require). Contrary to pre-
dictions, those with high AQ scores gave similar estimates of
the characters’ sense of satisfaction, but reported less personal
satisfaction than those with low AQ scores for going ‘above
and beyond’ to help others at their own expense.
Lower levels of pro-social behaviour might be linked to
limited perception of societal expectations, a reduced sense of
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pressure to comply with such expectations, and lower rewards
for helping others. The present study sought to explore this by
examining the role of societal expectations and sympathy for
others’ needs in guiding pro-social decision making. Par-
ticipants with high or low AQ scores were presented with a
new set of scenarios featuring a character in need. Each sce-
nario had two variant endings: a clear-cut versus ambiguous
social rule. In the ‘clear-cut’ condition there was a strong
social rule guiding the participants to behave pro-socially (i.e.
offer to give up your seat to an elderly woman walking with a
stick). In the ‘ambiguous’ condition the social rule was weaker
(i.e. offer to give up your seat to a young woman carrying a
heavy parcel).
Participants were asked to reason about why someone
might act pro-socially in the situation, and were also asked to
rate the characters’ expectations of help, their own likelihood
to help, and their sympathy for the characters in need. It was
predicted that the high AQ group would generate rationales for
pro-social behaviour that relied upon social rules, rather than
engaging with the individual perspectives of the characters, at
least in the clear-cut condition where there was a readily
available social rule. However, on the lower-demand measure
of rating characters’ expectations of help, it was postulated that
the high AQ group might not differ from the low AQ group, at
least for the clear-cut condition. It was predicted that those with
high AQ traits would be slower to produce responses, at least in
the ambiguous condition when less salient cues guiding pro-
social behaviour were provided. Although little work has ex-
amined this, it seemed probable that sympathy ratings and
likelihood of helping would be reduced in the high AQ group,
especially in the ambiguous condition where social rules were
less clear. However, it was also considered possible that the
high AQ group might differentiate more than the low AQ
group between the clear-cut and ambiguous conditions in their
sympathy ratings and likelihood of helping, showing more
‘black and white’ thinking consistent with a rigid reliance on
social rules. In support of this prediction, some previous work
with individuals with ASD reported that they showed height-
ened sensitivity to ‘good’ versus ‘poor’ justifications for
wrongdoing (Channon et al. 2010), and greater differentiation
between intentional and unintentional actions when assigning
blame (Channon et al. 2011).
Methods
Screening Phase
The Autism-Spectrum Quotient
The Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al.
2001) is a brief, self-report questionnaire with good internal
consistency, construct validity and test–retest reliability,
which measures personality traits associated with the
autistic spectrum in adults of typical intelligence. It uses a
four point Likert scale and yields total AQ trait scores
ranging from 0 to 50, with higher scores indicating higher
numbers of autistic traits. This measure was not designed as
a diagnostic tool, but rather for the identification of traits
and behaviours related to the autistic profile, containing 50
statements covering five different aspects of autistic
symptomatology: social skill, attention switching, attention
to detail, communication and imagination.
Participants and Procedure
Ethical approval was obtained from the UCL Research
Ethics Committee. An opportunistic sample of 645 full-
time university students (41.39 % female) who were fluent
in English and aged 18 or over (mean age 20 years) was
recruited for the screening phase of the study. All partici-
pants provided informed consent before completing the AQ
(Baron-Cohen et al. 2001). Participants were entered into a
prize draw and informed that they might be invited to take
part in the second phase of the study, for which they would
be paid. Total AQ scores were calculated for the whole
sample. AQ traits are more common in males than in
females (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001), thus in order to form
gender balanced high AQ and low AQ groups for the
experimental phase of the study participants within the
highest-scoring and lowest-scoring 10 % of males, and
highest-scoring and lowest-scoring 10 % of females, were
selected. Participants were contacted via email or tele-
phone and invited to take part in the second stage of the
study.
Experimental Phase
Participants and Procedure
20 (10 female, 10 male) individuals from the lower range
and 21 (11 male, 10 female) individuals from the upper
range took part in the experimental phase of the study,
forming two groups of low and high AQ participants. AQ
scores ranged from 2 to 9 in the low AQ group (2–9 for
male and 4–8 for female participants), and 26–46 in the
high AQ group (28–37 for male and 26–46 for female
participants). A t test confirmed that AQ scores differed
significantly between groups, t(1,39) = 23.23, p \ .001;
mean AQ scores were 30.52 (SD = 4.40) and 6.15 (SD =
1.66) for the high and low AQ groups respectively. The
groups did not differ significantly in age, t(1,39) = .064,
p = .950; mean age was 21.11 (SD = 2.62) and 21.06
(SD = 2.57) for the high and low groups respectively.
All participants were tested individually, and provided
written informed consent before completing the ‘Social
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Expectations’ task. Participants were also asked to com-
plete a brief health-screening questionnaire that asked
about any serious accidents or illnesses, psychological or
emotional difficulties; in practice no exclusions were
required. Participants were paid for their time and efforts.
The ‘‘Social Expectations’’ Task
The ‘‘Social Expectations Task’’ was designed to examine
pro-social behaviour in relation to some of the unwritten
social rules that govern everyday interactions, comparing
scenarios based on both clear-cut and ambiguous rules. A
range of scenarios were devised and piloted, in order to
refine the items and develop the scoring systems. The final
task consisted of 10 hypothetical scenarios involving the
participant and an unfamiliar character. The scenarios
consisted of everyday social situations where the par-
ticipant had the opportunity to engage in pro-social be-
haviour aiding the character, in line with a social rule.
Scenarios were designed such that it was clear the par-
ticipant was the only individual who could aid the char-
acter, and that engaging in the pro-social behaviour would
be inconvenient to the participant (e.g. offering to give up
your seat and stand for someone). The character was male
in half the scenarios, and female in the other half, and the
social context varied across scenarios to reflect a range of
natural situations. To control for order effects, two differ-
ent scenario orders were created and counterbalanced
within each group.
Each scenario stem had two endings, manipulating the
strength of the social rule guiding pro-social behaviour in
the situation. ‘Clear-cut’ endings implied a strong social
rule (e.g. ‘‘she is elderly and walking with a stick’’), cueing
an appropriate response (i.e. you should offer to give up
your seat). ‘Ambiguous’ endings still referred to a char-
acter that would benefit from help, but did not rely on such
strongly endorsed social rules (e.g. ‘‘she is a young adult
and is carrying a large parcel’’). For each scenario ending
participants were asked to give three ratings, indicating
how likely they would be to behave pro-socially, how
sympathetic they would feel towards the character, and
how strongly the character expected their help. Participants
were also asked to generate verbal responses explaining
why they might choose to help the character in the given
situation.
All participants first read a sheet of instructions about
the task. This explained that they would see short scenarios
about everyday situations and would respond verbally to
questions, supplying either ratings or free responses. Par-
ticipants were requested to answer as quickly and truthfully
as possible. The scenarios were presented on paper, and
participants were taken through an example before com-
pleting the 10 experimental items. Scenarios and questions
were presented in separate booklets such that relevant
scenarios remained on display throughout task perfor-
mance, in order to minimise any memory demands. Each
scenario was followed by four questions. Participants were
first asked to rate how likely they would be to help the
characters, and then to rate how sympathetic they felt
towards the characters. Participants were then asked to
indicate the strength of the characters’ expectations for
help, and finally to provide a rationale explaining why they
might offer to help the character. Response times for ra-
tionale production were recorded using a stopwatch. Total
response time was calculated by summing the speed of
response time across all 10 scenarios.
Example Scenario
You are sitting in a crowded waiting room with a
small bag, waiting for a delayed train. All the other
seats are taken by passengers with lots of luggage. A
woman enters the waiting room looking for a seat.
Clear-cut
Ending:
She is elderly and walking with a stick
Ambiguous
Ending:
She is a young adult and is carrying a
large parcel
Questions for Each Scenario
Likelihood of Pro-social
Behaviour Ratings:
How likely is it that you
would offer her your seat?
On a scale of 1–10: 1 = not at all likely,
10 = very likely
Sympathy for Character
Ratings:
How sympathetic do you
feel towards her?
On a scale of 1–10: 1 = not at all sympathetic,
10 = very sympathetic
Strength of Character
Expectation Ratings:
How much do you think she
expects you to offer her
your seat?
On a scale of 1–10: 1 = not at all, 10 = very
much
Verbal Rationales of
Societal Expectation
Understanding:
Why might you offer her
your seat?
Scoring
Likelihood of Pro-social Behaviour Ratings
For each scenario, participants rated the likelihood of
offering to help the characters on a scale of 1–10, where
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higher scores indicated greater pro-social behaviour.
Ratings were then summed across all 10 scenarios to
create a total score for each condition (range 10–100),
creating 2 scores: (1) clear-cut rule pro-social behaviour
rating, (2) ambiguous rule pro-social behaviour rating.
Sympathy for Character Ratings
For each scenario, participants rated the degree of sym-
pathy they experienced for the characters on a scale of
1–10, where higher scores indicated greater sympathy.
Ratings were then summed across all 10 scenarios to create
a total score for each condition (range 10–100), creating 2
scores: (1) clear-cut rule sympathy rating, (2) ambiguous
rule sympathy rating.
Strength of Character Expectation Ratings
For each scenario, participants rated how much they
thought the characters’ expected their help on a scale of
1–10, where higher scores indicated a greater expectation
to help. Ratings were then summed across all 10 scenarios
to create a total score for each condition (range 10–100),
creating 2 scores: (1) clear-cut rule character expectation
for help rating, (2) ambiguous rule character expectation
for help rating.
Verbal Rationales of Societal Expectation Understanding
Verbal responses were categorised according to two
dimensions: rule-based or person-based rationales. The
person-based rationales reflected responses that referred
to the characters’ needs, and/or conveyed a sense of self-
sacrifice on the part of the participants, in order to meet
the characters’ needs. Rule-based rationales reflected re-
sponses that made explicit reference to a social rule
guiding an expectation to help, or implied a social rule
by simply referring to the facts of the scenario. Scoring
of the example scenario is shown below in Table 1.
Responses could only score for one of the two dimen-
sions; if both dimensions were met then the best answer
was taken, and thus participants scored for person-based
rationales.
The responses were classified by one blind independent
rater, and one rater who was not blind to group member-
ship. There was an inter-rater agreement rate of 90.73 %;
all disagreements were resolved between the raters via
discussion. Once all responses had been classified and
disagreements resolved, participants’ scores were summed
across all 10 scenarios, and the percentage of person-based
versus rule-based responses was calculated for both the
clear-cut and ambiguous conditions.
Results
Data Analysis
Means and standard deviations (SD) for each of the mea-
sures are presented below in Table 2. A significance level
of .05 was adopted, with adjustment for post hoc t tests
(.05/2) to control for multiple comparisons.
Social Expectations Task
Likelihood of Pro-social Behaviour Ratings
A repeated measures 2 9 2 ANOVA was conducted to
examine ratings for likelihood of behaving pro-socially for
all scenarios. There was one between-participant factor
(AQ group: high vs low AQ) and one within-participant
factor (ambiguity of social rule: clear-cut vs ambiguous).
There were significant main effects of condition, F(1,39) =
491.87, p = .0001, and of group, F(1,39) = 6.79, p =
.013. The condition by group interaction was not sig-
nificant F(1,39) = .274, p = .604.
From inspection of the mean scores presented in
Table 2, it is clear that all participants were more likely to
behave pro-socially when the social rule was clear-cut
versus ambiguous. This is in line with the prediction that a
clear-cut rule would enhance the characters’ expectation
for help, and thus also the likelihood of complying with it.
The high AQ group was less pro-social overall; the lack of
condition of social rule by group interaction suggests that
the groups were not however differentially affected by the
strength of the social rule.
Sympathy for Character Ratings
A repeated measures 2 9 2 ANOVA was also conducted to
examine ratings for sympathy for all scenarios. There were
significant main effects of condition, F(1,39) = 356.63,
p = .0001, and group, F(1,39) = 11.4, p = .002. How-
ever, the condition by group interaction was not significant
F(1,39) = .486, p = .490.
The mean scores suggested that all participants were
more sympathetic when the rule was clear-cut versus
ambiguous. The high AQ participants were less sympa-
thetic towards characters overall; the lack of condition of
social rule by group interaction suggests that the groups
were not however differentially affected by the strength of
the social rule.
Strength of Character Expectation Ratings
A repeated measures 2 9 2 ANOVA was also conducted
to examine ratings for the strength of the characters’
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expectation for help across all scenarios. There was a
significant main effect of condition, F(1,39) = 175.41,
p = .0001. The main effect of group, F(1,39) = 1.24,
p = .272, and the condition by group interaction, were not
significant F(1,39) = .30, p = .864.
This confirms that the social rule manipulation operated
as intended; all participants identified a stronger character
expectation to help when the rule was clear-cut versus
ambiguous. The high AQ group rated the scenarios
similarly to the low AQ group identifying a stronger
character expectation for help in the clear-cut versus am-
biguous condition.
Verbal Rationales of Societal Expectation Understanding
Finally the high and low AQ groups were compared for
their verbal responses outlining why one might choose to
help the character in each scenario. A repeated measures
2 9 2 ANOVA was conducted to examine the percentage
of rationales classified as rule-based versus person-based
for the two conditions. The main effect of condition was
not significant F(1,39) = .114, p = .738, nor was the main
effect of group F(1,39) = 2.161, p = .150. However, there
was a significant condition by group interaction,
F(1,39) = 5.57, p = .023. Post-hoc t tests, using a strict
significance level, showed that the high AQ group used
significantly more rule-based versus person-based ratio-
nales than the low AQ group in the clear-cut condition,
t (1,39) = 2.327, p = .025; there was no significant group
difference in the ambiguous condition, t(1,39) = .269,
p = .790.
Total response time for rationale production was also
examined by summing the speed of response time across
all 10 scenarios and comparing the group averages. A re-
peated measure 2 9 2 ANOVA was conducted to examine
the speed of response time in the clear-cut versus am-
biguous condition. The main effect of condition was not
significant F(1,39) = .635, p = .431, neither was the main
effect of group F(1,39) = 1.672, p = .204. As with the
rationale classification measure, there was a significant
condition by group interaction, F(1,39) = 7.632, p = .009.
Post-hoc t tests, using a strict significance level, did not
reach significance. However, inspection of the mean scores
indicated a tendency for the high AQ group to be selec-
tively slower in the ambiguous, t (1,39) = 1.967, p = .060,
vs clear-cut condition, t(1,39) = .387, p = .701.
Discussion
The present study examined the role of social rules in
guiding pro-social behaviour, and how this might be in-
fluenced by autistic traits. A scenario-based task was de-
veloped describing everyday situations in which a
character required help. Each scenario had two conditions:
it ended with either a clear-cut or an ambiguous social rule
Table 1 Scoring of example scenario from the ‘Social Expectations’ task
Description of criteria
Person-based rationales
A response that either referred to the characters’ needs, and/or conveyed a sense of self-sacrifice on the participants’ part in order to meet the
characters’ needs
Rule-based rationales
A response that made explicit reference to a social rule guiding an expectation to help, or implied a social rule by simply referring to the facts
of the scenario
Example responses:
Clear-cut ending: ‘‘She is elderly and walking with a stick’’
Person-based rationale examples
e.g. ‘‘I would feel sorry for her and it would be difficult for her to stand in a crowded waiting room’’
e.g. ‘‘She needs it more than I do’’
Rule-based rationale examples
e.g. ‘‘You should always offer your seat to women, elderly and the disabled’’
e.g. ‘‘She is walking with a stick’’
Ambiguous ending: ‘‘She is a young adult and is carrying a large parcel’’
Person-based rationale examples
e.g. ‘‘She must be feeling very tired’’
e.g. ‘‘I think she needs it more than I do because she is carrying a large parcel’’
Rule-based rationale examples
e.g. ‘‘To be polite’’
e.g. ‘‘It is common courtesy to offer your seat’’
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guiding pro-social behaviour. Participants’ likelihood of
complying with these societal expectations and their sym-
pathy for the character was assessed using rating scales.
Their ‘understanding’ of the social expectation to help was
also assessed by two measures. Firstly, they indicated the
strength of the characters’ expectations of help using a
rating scale. Secondly, their justification for why one
would help was assessed via the generation of verbal
rationales.
The key finding with respect to pro-social behaviour was
that, as expected, the high AQ participants were less likely
to behave pro-socially overall, but the groups were not
differentially affected by the strength of social rule
manipulation. Thus, all participants were more compliant
with the expectation to help characters in the clear-cut
versus ambiguous condition. For instance, in the example
scenario, participants were much more likely to help when
the character was elderly and walking with a stick, but far
less likely to help when she was young and carrying a
heavy parcel; the high AQ group gave lower likelihood of
helping ratings than the low AQ group across conditions.
With respect to the sympathy ratings, all participants were
more sympathetic in the clear-cut versus ambiguous con-
dition. The high AQ group was thus less likely to feel
sympathy for the characters, regardless of the clarity of the
social rule.
Table 2 Mean percentage scores and standard deviations for all measures for the ‘Social Expectations’ task
Low AQ group
(N = 20) M (SD)
High AQ group
(N = 21) M (SD)
Significance Effect Size
Likelihood (%) Condition **
Gp *
Gp 9 condition NS
Clear-cut 86.95 (9.26) 78.42 (9.68) – 0.90
Ambiguous 55.10 (10.16) 48.05 (12.73) – 0.61
Sympathy (%) Condition **
Gp **
Gp 9 condition NS
Clear-cut 80.25 (9.25) 68.81 (13.09) – 1.01
Ambiguous 43.85 (9.55) 35.00 (12.62) – 0.79
Strength of expectation (%) Condition **
Gp NS
Gp 9 condition NS
Clear-cut 76.05 (9.01) 73.24 (2.17) – 0.43
Ambiguous 54.15 (8.77) 50.76 (11.09) – 0.34
Verbal rationale classification (%) Condition NS
Gp NS
Gp 9 condition **
Clear-cut
Rule 33.00 (18.38) 49.05 (25.08) 025** 0.73
Person 67.00 (18.38) 50.95 (25.08) 0.73 0.73
Ambiguous
Rule 40.5 (20.64) 39.05 (13.38) – 0.08
Person 59.5 (20.64) 60.95 (13.38) – 0.08
Verbal rationale response time (s)
Condition NS
Gp NS
Gp 9 condition **
Clear-cut 87.35 (24.09) 90.76 (31.61) – 0.12
Ambiguous 81.30 (20.75) 101.71 (42.53) – 0.61
** Significant at p = .01; ** Significant at p = .025
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Did those with high AQ traits understand the societal
expectations inherent in the scenarios? One way of esti-
mating these societal expectations was by asking par-
ticipants to rate the extent to which the characters expected
help. Interestingly, the groups did not differ in this; the
high AQ group was equally able to identify the stronger
expectation to behave pro-socially in the clear-cut versus
ambiguous condition. However, when asked to complete
the more demanding task of providing verbal rationales
outlining why one might behave pro-socially, the picture
was more complex. In the clear-cut condition the low AQ
group used more person-based rationales (e.g. she needs
the seat more than me) than rule-based rationales reflecting
societal expectations (e.g. you should always give up your
seat for the elderly), whereas the high AQ group used these
equally. In the ambiguous condition, both groups used
slightly more person-based than rule-based rationales. In-
spection of the rationale production response times re-
vealed a condition by group interaction suggesting that the
high AQ group was selectively slower for the ambiguous
versus clear-cut condition when producing rationales,
although this did not hold as significant when post hoc
t-tests were conducted.
The findings of the present study corroborate those of
Jameel et al. (2014), providing further evidence of reduced
pro-social behaviour in individuals with high numbers of
autistic traits. The two studies taken together also reveal
some hint of preserved social knowledge in the high AQ
group, but differences between groups in the socio-emo-
tional processes thought to motivate pro-social behaviour.
Various theoretical accounts associated with ASD may be
relevant for explaining the pattern of findings reported in
those with high AQ traits, in particular the role of emo-
tional empathy, mentalising, and the potential influence of
social knowledge and learning. It is also possible that non-
social models such as impaired executive functioning (Hill
2004) or weak central coherence (Frith 1989, 2003) make a
contribution, although they are not discussed in detail here.
Impaired Emotional Empathy?
Since both emotional and cognitive components of empa-
thy are thought to play a role in motivating pro-social
behaviour (Eisenberg 2007), this theoretical account could
explain the decreased pro-social behaviour displayed by
the high AQ group. With regard to ASD, although it has
been posited that this is associated with impaired menta-
lising but intact emotional empathy (Blair 2008), there is
some conflict in the literature exploring this. Some studies
examining the recognition of, and response to, affective
expressions have reported impairment in ASD (Humphreys
et al. 2007) and others have not (Adolphs et al. 2001). This
inconsistent picture may reflect the differing intellectual
capabilities of individuals with ASD and/or a variety of
task demands (Blair 2008).
It has also been suggested that those with ASD may
possess limited capacity to resonate emotionally with oth-
ers via a self-focused stance, mediated by a heightened
sense of egocentricity, at the expense of the ability to take
an allocentric (other-focused) stance (Frith and de Vigne-
mont 2005; Minio-Paluello et al. 2009). With respect to the
present AQ study, it is possible that an imbalance in the
priorities placed on self versus other needs resulted in less
motivation to behave pro-socially, regardless of whether
the high AQ group could correctly identify and understand
the characters’ needs. The high AQ participants may
therefore have focused on themselves and prioritised their
own interests at the expense of helping others, and expe-
riencing reduced resonance with the characters’ points of
view may have compounded this.
However, impairment in emotional empathy could not
account for the greater tendency of the high AQ group to
use rule-based rationales in the clear-cut condition when
reasoning about why one should behave pro-socially, nor
the differences observed in the speed of rationale produc-
tion. Impairment in emotional empathy in the context of
intact mentalising abilities would not be expected to affect
the high AQ group’s capacity to understand how they
should behave and why; rather, it should selectively in-
fluence their actual behaviour. Nonetheless, a possible
contribution of emotional empathy cannot be dismissed,
since it is difficult to disentangle the relative contributions
of this versus mentalising in relation to measures designed
to explore everyday social behaviour.
Impaired Mentalising?
A mentalising explanation would contend that other-ori-
ented pro-social behaviour is dependent upon appreciating
others’ perspectives, and acting accordingly; failure to do
so may have reduced the participants’ incentive to help the
characters, resulting in reduced compliance with the soci-
etal expectation to behave pro-socially. This explanation is
consistent with some evidence in studies of those with high
autistic traits suggesting differences on tasks tapping
mentalising including social attention (Freeth et al. 2013)
and poorer performance on false belief tasks (Best et al.
2008).
The sympathy ratings may provide the most direct
measure of mentalising. Sympathy refers to feelings of
concern about the welfare of others, and is thought to play
a motivating role in pro-social behaviour via other-oriented
processes (Decety and Michalska 2010). Whilst sympathy
and empathy are often conflated, they are in fact distinct
concepts; the experience of sympathy is said to be depen-
dent upon the mentalistic ability to apprehend another’s
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mental state, but it does not necessarily require a vicarious
emotional experience (Decety and Chaminade 2003). On
this basis, sympathising with characters in the social
expectations task requires participants to put themselves in
others’ shoes and imagine how they would feel in such a
situation, and is potentially mediated by mentalising abil-
ities. Lower sympathy ratings by the high AQ group are
therefore consistent with the evidence of impaired men-
talising in those with ASD.
Some previous work has reported ‘black and white’
sympathy ratings in those with ASD, with heightened
sensitivity to ‘good’ versus ‘poor’ justifications for
wrongdoing (Channon et al. 2010), and greater differ-
entiation between intentional and unintentional actions
when assigning blame (Channon et al. 2011). No evidence
of such ‘black and white’ thinking was found in the present
AQ study, since sympathy ratings were lower overall in the
high versus low AQ group, and the groups were not dif-
ferentially affected by the strength of the social rule.
However, the nature of the present study is different to
those previously used, since in the Channon et al. tasks,
lack of sympathy in the group with ASD related to char-
acters acting for reasons that generally contravene societal,
and indeed legal, expectations (e.g. drunk driving after a
party, or intentionally giving a spouse an overdose of their
medication). By contrast, in the present AQ study, the
characters were all deserving of help and thus sympathy,
regardless of the condition.
The Role of Social Knowledge and Learning
One potential caveat for an interpretation consistent with a
mentalising deficit is that those with high AQ traits did not
differ from the low trait group on some measures assessing
participants’ understanding of characters’ expectations for
help. At first glance it might appear that a mentalistic ap-
praisal is required to grasp the characters’ expectations.
However, routes other than mentalising may also lead to
similar judgments of the characters’ expectations, such as
reliance on knowledge of societal norms. More broadly, it
has been suggested that individuals with ASD may not rely
on intuitive socio-emotional processes for solving social
and moral dilemmas (Greene and Haidt 2002). Rather, it
may be a more laborious process in which individuals with
ASD learn about and apply social rules, especially when
these are readily available.
Thus, in the clear-cut task condition of the current study
where the social rules were more salient, the high AQ
group appeared to draw upon these rules by providing more
rule-based and fewer person-based justifications for the
reasons surrounding why one should act pro-socially. On
the other hand, when salient rules were not available in the
ambiguous condition, the high AQ group was able to
produce person-based rationales as often as the low AQ
group. This may indicate a stylistic preference for rule-
based reasoning over reliance on mentalistic processes,
which may be more effortful for them. This interpretation
is also supported by the finding that those with high AQ
traits tended to be slower to produce rationales only in the
ambiguous condition. A lack of salient social rules un-
derpinning the scenarios may have forced them to exert
more effort and employ person-based rationale, making
heavier demands on mentalising ability.
This is also consistent with previous literature indicating
that individuals with ASD might provide correct answers,
but that the reasoning behind their judgments is often more
limited (Moran et al. 2011). For instance, children with
ASD have been found to show accurate moral judgements
(Grant et al. 2005; Leslie et al. 2006), and intact under-
standing of transgressions involving breaking social versus
moral rules (Blair 1996), but to display difficulties in jus-
tifying their choices. Zalla et al. (2009) similarly found that
adults with ASD were able to use compensatory strategies
to carry out social judgments regarding faux-pax, but failed
to justify their responses adequately.
Interpreting the findings of the present AQ study in the
light of previous relevant work in ASD, it appears that
individuals with high numbers of autistic traits may show
some preservation of social judgement and assimilate the
characters’ expectations (a mentalistic demand), by seem-
ingly exploiting their knowledge of rules regarding societal
norms. Further evidence supporting the use of compen-
satory mechanisms within the autistic spectrum can be
derived from a recent neuroimaging study that asked why
some children with ASD pass classic mentalising tasks, and
others do not (White et al. 2014). They subdivided ASD
participants into groups who either failed or passed such
tasks, and compared their brain activation patterns with
those of typically developing children during an online
mentalising task. Regardless of whether they belonged to
the ‘fail’ or ‘pass’ groups, participants with ASD showed
differences in brain regions associated with mentalising in
comparison to typically developing children. This suggests
that even individuals with ASD who pass such tasks may
be doing so via an alternative route.
In the present AQ study, reliance on compensatory
mechanisms such as social knowledge may have cir-
cumvented the need to employ mentalistic processes when
estimating the characters’ expectations. However, this may
be at the expense of resonating with someone emotionally,
and hence this may explain why the high AQ group
reported less sympathy with the characters, and were less
likely to help them. Both mentalisitic abilities and emo-
tional empathy play a key role in facilitating socially
sensitive behaviour, and it is likely that healthy individuals
use both social knowledge stores and socio-emotional
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processes to assess social scenarios and respond appro-
priately. In order to make good use of social rules to deal
with complex social stimuli in a range of contexts, flex-
ibility is required to learn about the contingencies for
applying rules appropriately to different conditions (Nelson
and Guyer 2011; Bunge 2004). This is likely to draw upon
executive skills, which are thought to be impaired in
individuals diagnosed with ASD (see Hill 2004 for a
review). From a developmental perspective, as children
become adolescents, and in turn adults, the complexity of
the social environments they navigate increases dramati-
cally. In typically developing children, this should be
supported by gradually enhanced social knowledge, as a
result of exposure to more challenging and ambiguous
social environments. However, in children and adolescents
with ASD, who tend to avoid social engagement (Richer
1976), and/or experience the social world in an ‘atypical’
fashion (Hughes and Leekam 2004), such learning may be
deficient. Thus, the acquisition of social rule knowledge
and its use may be further protracted or stunted in those
with ASD. With respect to the current study, this could
account for the high AQ group’s failure to put their rela-
tively preserved knowledge of social rules into practice by
choosing to help the characters.
Implications and Applications for Everyday Social
Functioning
The present study examined individuals drawn from the
general population with high AQ traits and did not require a
clinical diagnosis of ASD. One might expect those with high
AQ traits to show a muted, albeit similar, pattern of social
performance to those with a clinical diagnosis of ASD.
Although there is no evidence of a bimodal distribution
separating out clinical and non-clinical levels of impair-
ments (Skuse et al. 2005), a clear dose–response relationship
for degree of autistic traits has yet to be established. Whilst
the pattern of findings from the present study is broadly
consistent with literature examining social functioning in
individuals diagnosed with ASD versus neurotypical con-
trols, it would nevertheless be important to extend these
measures to a clinical sample before clinical applications
could be developed from these findings. This could also help
to establish the validity of the assumption that there is a
continuum of social ability relating to the number and
severity of autistic traits, regardless of a clinical threshold.
Social difficulties such as problems in forming or
maintaining interpersonal relationships or engaging in
inappropriate behaviour are often central to the everyday
struggles that individuals with ASD face (Troisi 2008;
Crespi and Badcock 2008). In order to design effective
interventions, such as social skill training, it is important to
have a detailed understanding of how individuals’
symptoms may interact with the environment and disrupt
everyday functioning. At present, this level of under-
standing is very limited, with most work focusing on either
abstract laboratory based tasks or clinical reports. Tasks
such as the current one provide a rich source of material for
understanding of the nature of everyday difficulties that
those with high AQ traits, or possibly a diagnosis of ASD,
may face. It could potentially be used in clinical settings to
identify factors that may facilitate or impinge upon suc-
cessful everyday social functioning, and to better inform
interventions (Channon et al. 2014). The findings of the
present study with respect to reduced pro-social behaviour
in those with high AQ traits, highlight the need for social
skills training to embrace both expanding individuals’
knowledge of social rules (e.g. you should give up your
seat to someone elderly), and to target the flexible appli-
cation of social rules to novel situations. In individuals
diagnosed with ASD an overreliance on social rules,
without a deeper understanding of the social implications
or caveats, may lead to awkward and inflexible patterns of
social behaviour. Compensatory cognitive strategies can be
useful in the face of reduced or absent capacity to access
appropriate socio-emotional processing. However, they
must be combined with enhanced social motivation;
otherwise, individuals may be aware of the rules, but fail to
act on them, as appears to have been the case in the present
study. Social motivation is an area of research that has been
neglected in ASD, and which requires further exploration.
For instance, it would be interesting to study how rewards
are processed by individuals with high AQ traits or ASD,
and which kind of rewards might facilitate appropriate
behaviour.
A potential limitation of the study concerns the validity
and sensitivity of measures such as the Social Expectations
task that attempt to tap everyday social behaviour. The
strength of tasks such as this is that they use real-life-type
materials to investigate performance. Real-life-type mate-
rials have advantages over more traditional abstract labora-
tory tasks, since they are more likely to draw upon both social
and practical knowledge acquired both directly and indi-
rectly through life experience, in addition to intellectual
skills. Despite these advantages, however, any task that is
carried out under experimental conditions with structured
cues that constrain and prompt performance in a manner that
can be easily measured and interpreted, has limitations with
respect to real world validity. Such cues are often lacking in
everyday life and their presence in experimental tests may
thus lead to a lack of correspondence with real world per-
formance and an underestimation of social difficulties
outside of the laboratory (Channon et al. 2001). This is
particularly pertinent when assessing individuals who share
characteristics of ASD, where high-functioning individuals
have been found to pass traditional mentalising tasks but to
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show difficulties with more open-ended and naturalistic
measures (Heavey et al. 2000). It is therefore important to try
to replicate these findings in more naturalistic environments,
which can often be much more stimulating and inter-
personally demanding. One way forward may be through the
use of virtual reality paradigms.
Conclusion
The present study found that those with high AQ traits
were overall less pro-social and sympathetic towards
characters in need of their help, regardless of the strength
of the social rule underpinning this. However, individuals
with high AQ traits were equally able to estimate char-
acters’ expectations for their help. This apparent conflict
may reflect a reliance on social knowledge to estimate
characters’ expectations on the basis of learned societal
expectations, amongst other possible contributing factors.
In line with this, those with high AQ traits tended to pro-
duce more rule-bound rationales to reason about why they
were expected to help characters in the clear-cut condition,
although not in the ambiguous condition where the social
rules were less salient. This may again reflect a level of
understanding that is more reliant on social knowledge, at
the expense of utilising socio-emotional processes to en-
gage directly with the characters’ needs. This reinforces
and extends the findings of a previous study (Jameel et al.
2014), which indicated that those with high AQ traits
demonstrated a relatively intact ability to assess characters’
perspectives in the context of reduced pro-social behaviour,
and reported less personal reward for helping them.
Overall, the current study suggests that certain aspects of
social judgement may be intact in those with high AQ traits,
perhaps as a result of reliance on knowledge previously ac-
quired through everyday experience in the social world.
However, whilst reliance upon social knowledge may be
useful for navigating social situations, it may be insufficient
for motivating identification with others’ needs and subse-
quent pro-social behaviour. Although there is a wealth of lit-
erature exploring cognitive accounts of ASD, there is very
little work either in those with high AQ traits or with ASD
examining how these differences translate into everyday so-
cial functioning and impact on broader aspects of social in-
teraction. Tasks such as that used in the present AQ study
could be instrumental in providing a basis for a sensitive
methodology to improve understanding of the nature of ev-
eryday difficulties associated with autistic characteristics, and
could potentially be applied to clinical populations to improve
interventions such as social-skill training.
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